Building Peaceful Citizens?
Nation-building in divided societies

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Introduction
Interventions aimed at citizenship formation and nation-building in divided and post-conflict societies place great emphasis on promoting and entrenching peace as a cornerstone of economic development and statehood. Contributing to these practices, dominant international foreign, security and development policies frequently prioritise a double-agenda of peace- and democracy-building in ‘troubled’ states (Hippler, 2008). Such efforts are increasingly multi-scalar in their scope, encompassing interventions that aim at building democratic institutions and the responsible citizens who are meant to participate and legitimate those institutions, even in contexts where citizenship may itself be a ‘troubled’ concept. The pursuit of peace would thus seem, on the surface, to be an unproblematic, universal ideal that would ensure not only the stability of the Westphalian state system but also of domestic socio-political structures and economic development processes. However, peace is a contested and complex concept imbued with and deployed to exert power (Galtung, 1969, 1990; Lloyd, 2012; Richmond, 2008a; Williams and McConnell, 2011; see also the exchanges between Springer and Megoran: Megoran, 2011, 2014; Springer, 2014a, b) and render citizens themselves responsible for enacting peace and democracy.

As we explore in this paper, dominant international pedagogies and policies for peace-building in divided societies can be and have been critiqued as neo-colonial interventions linked to broader geopolitical concerns and used to maintain existing power relations and hierarchies between and within nation-states. Domestic efforts to develop peace and ‘peaceful’ citizens may postpone or ignore altogether imperatives for justice in the name of reconciliation. Likewise, such efforts can be used to stifle dissent and criticism through exhortations to patriotism, unity, civility, and nation-building. However, Pykett’s (2010) research on citizenship pedagogy complicates top-down notions of peace-building through citizenship formation, arguing that pedagogical practices encourage a certain
reflexive scepticism rather than a uniform reproduction of prevailing liberal notions of peace or citizenship. In other words, there is a need to understand the situated knowledges and contextual definitions of peace – in Koopman’s (2011: 193-194) words, to ‘unsettle “peace” by exposing how it is both portrayed and visualized, as well as practiced and materialized’. To do so allows us to understand peace as mutable and dynamic, ‘a socio-spatial relation that is always made and made again’ (Koopman, 2011: 194). Indeed, as this paper seeks to highlight, the unquestionable ‘goodness’ of peace that makes this concept so useful as a technique of governance also allows it to be re-claimed and re-defined to suit counter-hegemonic political purposes that open up rather than shut down the question of what peace means. The productive ambiguity of the concept may allow different groups to pursue their own particular agendas under the consensus of peace in ways that diverge from notions of liberal peace.

This paper provides a conceptual exploration of the complex ways in which discourses of peace are used by both international and domestic actors to promote citizenship in divided societies. We begin by critically examining the concept of peace before reflecting on the politics of peace as a pedagogy and component of nation-building and citizenship formation agendas. In so doing, we seek to highlight the contestations around the seemingly benign and unproblematic notion of peace and draw attention both to the ways that discourses of peace are used to promote particular foreign policy agendas, and how the language of peace is used in efforts to demand wider systemic change that directly confronts rather than passively conforms to those agendas. Here we focus on the incongruities in civil society actors’ approaches to peace, and their efforts to achieve sometimes conflicting aims, within divided societies.

**Defining Peace**

As noted above, peace is widely seen as a universal good – a perception that makes it a concept easily marshalled into hegemonic political discourse. This discourse relies upon a particular conceptualisation of peace, namely ‘liberal peace’, which has become orthodoxy in Western policy realms (Boege et al., 2009; Richmond, 2008a; Stokke, 2009). Liberal peace is rooted in Kantian thought and is intrinsically linked to the promotion of democracy, rule of law, human rights, and free markets (Richmond, 2008b). In positing that democratic development promotes peace (as ‘democracies do not go to war with each other’ (Mac Ginty 2008: 143)), stability, justice and the entrenchment of human rights (Richmond 2008a; Jones 2012), liberal peace is concerned with the exporting of liberal democratic and market ideals to (post)conflict environments (Chandler, 2010). Thus, realising these goals requires international engagement and co-operation, not least due to the interdependencies of the Westphalian political system and globalised markets and economies and imperative to ensure economic and political stability in order to promote security and development underpin liberalism theory and liberal peace.

The discourse of (liberal) peace is enrolled in projects of governance at a variety of scales from the transnational to the national and local, encompassing post-war state-building efforts to re-construct democratic institutions (e.g. Manning 2006) as well as local peace-building programs to mould democratic citizen-subjects through the promotion of
participation, empowerment, and engagement (e.g. Manning 2007; Staeheli et al forthcoming). Not only are efforts made to construct these institutions and actors, but also to co-opt them as agents promoting peace and democracy (Zahar, 2012; Jones 2012: 129). Although multi-scalar in approach, many such peace-building efforts enshrine a singular dedication to particular Western liberal notions of peace and democracy which often serve to entrench the status quo of international geopolitics and power relations (Mac Ginty, 2008). Indeed, critics such as Boege et al (2009) argue that such formulaic and universal application of the liberal peace-building framework not only fail to acknowledge the different historical and political contexts of those subject to peace-building interventions, but the long and bloody history of liberal peace in the West. Richmond (2008a: 440) argues that this quest for liberal peace has ‘in many post-conflict settings, proved to create a “virtual peace”, empty states and institutions that are ambivalent about everyday life’. In other words, liberal peace has secured only a ‘negative’ peace – the absence of war – without promoting ‘positive’ peace – the integration of society, overcoming of structural violence and pursuit of social justice (Galtung, 1964, 1969; Sooka, 2011). Goetschel and Hagmann (2009) mobilise a similar critique, arguing that peace-building missions focus on bureaucratic issues and thus, while claiming to pursue positive peace, produce an instrumentalist and depoliticised ‘donor peace’. The elite-driven, donor-peace process in Sri Lanka exemplifies this, securing a negative peace and formal – and not substantive – version of democracy (Stokke, 2009). While the absence of violence, or negative peace, is certainly a welcome alternative to overt war, approaches that fail to acknowledge the social, political, and economic drivers of conflict at a grassroots level, as well as local understandings and conceptions of peace, risk prolonging or exacerbating such conflicts (see Lloyd, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2008).

If, therefore, dominant liberal notions of peace have been preoccupied with negative peace or the absence of violence, then any critical understanding of peace must also take into account different conceptions and understandings of violence (Galtung, 1969; Lloyd, 2012). Going beyond conventional understandings of war and conflict associated with physical violence, Galtung (1969; 1990) defines violence more broadly as any preventable or controllable influence that reduces a person’s potential. This definition encompasses structural as well as psychological, emotional, cultural, and representational forms of violence. This broader understanding of violence leads to an extended conceptualisation of peace as the absence of indirect structural violence and the presence of physical, psychological, emotional, and cultural security. Approaches to peace-building that reproduce the individualism of political and economic liberalism not only fail to account for indirect forms of violence but may inadvertently perpetuate them by ‘replicating the conditions of inequality that gave rise to the conflict in the original instance’ (Ross, 2011: 198) while leaving in place ‘hierarchical exploitation and self-interest by elites, which can only be curtailed by social actors aiming at social justice’ (Richmond, 2008a: 446).

Put another way, peace is always conceived and put into practice within a field of power relations: peace can mean radical change toward ideals of social justice or it can be a
‘mechanism employed by the powerful to resist exactly such change’ (Williams, Megoran, and McConnell, 2014: 14). Like war, peace is not an inevitable outcome of structural process, but is rather a ‘highly contingent’ situated practice or social construction open to influence (Kobayashi 2009, p. 825). There is, therefore, a need for contextually-sensitive understandings of and engagements to promote peace (Lloyd, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2008) that acknowledge the multiple scales and spaces implicated in discussions of peace and violence: from the intimate and domestic, to the communal, national and international.

Critical engagements with dominant understandings of violent conflict have thus pushed for greater recognition of the everyday encounters with power, violence and peace, and the need to understand these in terms of intimate and embodied experience (see Brickell, 2015; Kobayashi, 2009; Pain, 2015). This strand of research extends the work of, and finds common cause with, a feminist geopolitics approach which focuses on peace and conflict as everyday, embodied practices, and stresses researcher accountability to local communities enduring violence (Hyndman 2000). Williams and McConnell (2011: 929) similarly advocate for more research on the multiple sites and scales at which ‘peace is differentially constructed, materialized and interpreted’ in different places. This entails widening the frame of analysis to include ‘peace-ful’ concepts such as ‘tolerance, friendship, hope, reconciliation, justice, cosmopolitanism, resistance, solidarity, hospitality, and empathy’ (Williams and McConnell, 2011: 930). As Lloyd (2012) suggests, different groups of people and different institutional actors deploy terms like war, peace, and violence in different ways, constituting a field of discursive struggle over the meanings of violence and peace. As these engagements make clear, there is a need for multi-scaler analysis linking local, everyday practices and understandings of peace to geopolitical processes and actors. Such an approach allows scholars to critically engage with questions of power by asking who benefits from certain formulations of peace and what work these discursive practices perform (Williams et al., 2014). Allied to this concern is a discussion relating to the construction and legitimation of the liberal peace orthodoxy, and how these ideas spread and how those involved in peace-building at multiple scales learn (and rework) the liberal scripts of peace through networks of power and influence (see Megoran, 2011; also Staeheli et al., forthcoming).

By picking apart the contingencies of peace, by highlighting mundane peaceful processes and by challenging the dominant discourses of liberal peace, we can open up hermetically sealed notions of peace to critical examination in order to identify potential forms of violence concealed within. Through such practices, it is possible to question the political processes which, in promoting liberal peace, may result in the ‘replication of the conditions of inequality that gave rise to the conflict in the original instance’ (Ross, 2011: 198) and hinder the realisation of social justice and substantive peace (see Richmond, 2008).

**Peace-Building And Governmentality**

The promotion of liberal peace-building agendas in many post-conflict societies is, as intimated above, intended not only to maintain international political and economic stability but also to foster the spread and entrenchment of Western liberalism (Hippler,
The priorities of the UN’s Peace Building Fund – to promote peaceful conflict resolution, economic revitalisation and administrative rebuilding – illustrate how democratic political stability and economic growth are viewed as key to realising peace (at both national and international levels) (Boege et al., 2009; Stokke, 2009). Integral to such practices are efforts towards the production of peaceful, democratic citizens who will both facilitate the development of and respect the authority of the state institutions and agencies charged with providing stability, security and social control to maintain peace and repress alternative sources of violence (Hippler 2008). In other words, alongside efforts to re-build state structures we see discourses of peace and reconciliation deployed in profoundly powerful and political ways to mould individual democratic citizen-subjects through formal and informal education to promote participation, empowerment, and engagement so as to also co-opt them as agents promoting both democracy and peace (Jones, 2012; Zahar, 2012). In this way, the discourse of peace can be viewed as a tool of governmentality, a (neoliberal) technique of government used to achieve security through encouraging self-management by promoting the production of specific kinds of citizen-subjects who will be productive, supportive members of the nation (Foucault, 2009; Lemke, 2001).

The quest to develop ‘peaceful citizens’ can therefore be seen as in keeping with the desire of states to build citizens in ways that go beyond individual ‘well-being’ and to develop them as governable political subjects and community members (Staeheli and Hammett, 2010). As noted above, peace can thus be used as a tool of governmentality to secure (self)discipline through citizenship, perpetuating particular hierarchies of power in the process, (Durrheim, 1997; Foucault, 2009; Mahrouse, 2006) and to stifle the development of democracy (Hammett, 2010; Waghid 2009). Deployments of discourses and pedagogies of peace in post-conflict societies frequently utilise ideals of cosmopolitanism to promote ideals of (social) justice, care and non-violence (Osler and Starkey, 2003). Through such interventions, efforts are made to mould and govern citizens, providing a framework for their relations with each other, as well as with ideals of peace, tolerance, reconciliation and democracy (Durrheim, 1997). The permeation of peace- and democracy-building agendas into citizenship pedagogies are evident in the citizenship ideals evident in state and civil society produced (educational) materials, as well as in funding and other support for citizenship development and peacebuilding (see Marshall and Staeheli, 2015; Nagel and Staeheli 2014). The dominance within such efforts of Western liberalism (and thus, liberal peace ideals) risks not only overlooking but also actively excluding local contextual factors, understandings and histories that may be integral to realising substantive, sustainable peace.

The projection and reception of particular understandings of peace can therefore determine not only who is included or excluded from the ‘peaceful’ nation, but also which histories, injustices and identities form part of both the peacebuilding process and the legitimating narrative of the nation. Who belongs is thus not simply a legal administrative concern but a potentially divisive socio-political process rooted in the social construction of citizenship and both historic and contemporary regional, ethnic, religious and other divisions (Bah, 2010). These concerns highlight the importance and
complexity of developing a narrative of the collective history of a divided society not only in resolving contested claims as to who belongs but also in reconciling histories of division, oppression and conflict between groups of citizens (Bah, 2010). These complexities have been identified in various divided or post-conflict settings including the difficulties of remembering and discussing the injustices and inequalities of apartheid while seeking to build a multi-racial South Africa (Staeheli and Hammett, 2013) and the deployment of a ‘culture-of-peace’ narrative amongst civil society organisations and school textbooks in Guatemala (Oglesby, 2007). As Oglesby (2007: 80) observes, the culture-of-peace pedagogy is a powerful tool of governmentality, instilling an individualized notion of rights while delimiting boundaries of acceptable memory. By placing responsibility for society’s failings back on the individual citizen, this framework instructed ‘peaceful’ ways of being embedded in a liberal democratic subject (Oglesby, 2007). Thus, while this discourse of peace opened up a space to talk about violence and war it was limited to a tautological argument about a cultural of violence being the cause of the violence.

Marshall (2014) has similarly argued in the case of Palestine that interventions promoting ‘peaceful’ forms of expression among Palestinian youngsters may themselves be forms of violence, foreclosing potentially productive political understandings of the Israeli occupation. Promoting vague notions of peace obscure the inherent structural inequalities of asymmetric warfare thus limiting young people’s political understanding of the violence they endure in ways that are damaging to their sense-making and thus their resiliency (Sousa and Marshall 2015). These concerns are exacerbated by the fact that those providing and receiving messages of peaceful citizenship ‘are also agents who have their own histories and perspectives’ who use their own agency to contest and negotiate the messages and ideals being delivered to them (Jones, 2012: 127; also Staeheli and Hammett, 2010, 2013), and whose receptivity towards and engagement with these ideals may be informed by perceptions of fair treatment and enjoyment of equality of citizenship (Hammett, 2008). These discussions highlight how deeper understandings of the ways in which – and outcomes of – liberal peacebuilding projects highlight the necessity to go beyond conceptualising peace, conflict and in/security as technical concerns, and confront the political, social, historical and economic contributors to peace and violence, as well as the governmental power of discourses of peace.

**Experiencing and Contesting ‘Peace’**

As outlined above, ‘peace’ in peace-building programmes is often ‘liberal peace’ focussed on promoting democracy and preventing conflict at national and community levels (Jones, 2012). However, the everyday understanding of ‘peace’ in post-conflict societies can be far more contested, and subject to socio-cultural, geopolitical and scalar interpretations. The question emerges as to what are the limits to the discourse of peace and whose version of peace is to be maintained, when, where and by whom? Ongoing research in which the authors are involved addresses youth citizenship promotion as a mode of peace-building in South Africa, Lebanon and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Interviews with NGOs in Lebanon provide an instructive illustration of the discourse of peace as a terrain of conflict, and the creative use that some organizations make of the productive
ambiguity of peace. In Lebanon, several national and international NGOs were reluctant to use the term ‘peace’ or ‘peacebuilding’ as this was interpreted as making peace with an external enemy, and a peace that often suggested a form of surrender and pacification,

“‘peace’ is viewed as peace with the enemy, whether the Palestinian, the Syrian, the Lebanese” (International NGO, Lebanon, 28/10/2014).

‘in this region we have a sensitivity to the word “peace”… subconsciously it means peace with Israel. Nobody uses the word peace or “salam” here, they prefer to use the term “silm ahli” or civil peace… “Silm” just means no war, it doesn't mean living together naturally. Civil peace means not having war but also not having a normal relationship’ (National NGO, Lebanon, 8/9/2014)

These quotes illustrate not only how the universalised assumptions of Western liberal peace are problematic, and the ways in which words like peace or coexistence presume and thus foreclose any discussion of what kind of peaceful coexistence is being worked toward and by whom. Furthermore, thus illustrate the need to recognise how intersections of geopolitics and regional histories inform the deployment of ‘peace’ in citizenship pedagogies. In this context, popular interpretation of ‘peace’ assumes a link to continuing international/regional tensions and the broader ‘Middle East Peace Process’ and associated politics. The utilisation of ‘silm ahli’ connotes a form of ‘negative peace’, one where there is simply an absence of war or conflict. There is, in these interviews, little sense of the possibility of a near-times realisation of a more ‘positive peace’, one in which an absence of war is supplemented by greater social justice (a lack of indirect violence (Roberts, 2008)). The quotes above also indicate a fragility to peace in this citizen-building process, that peace is correlated with tolerance rather than reconciliation (people living together but not in a ‘normal’ relationship). Within this context, peace-building projects are caught in a nexus of power relations, linguistic nuances and contested realms of governmentality. Peace thus becomes a site – and term – of contestation, one that reflects religious difference, geopolitical tensions and experiences of partially-delivered citizenship, and that is rooted in a history of conflict and division: the scars of which remain evident today, but which is largely silenced in discussions of peace- and nation-building.

In many divided societies, therefore, we see how the nuances of language and terminology around peace and coexistence are freighted with both particular assumptions about what peace should look like but also a lack of common language and ‘collective memory’ through which to communicate and reconcile past (and current) conflict (National NGO, Lebanon, interview, 1/12/2014). The lack of non-confrontational language or spaces for open, non-discriminating discussion of violence (see Staeheli and Hammett, 2010; Waghid, 2009) often results in efforts to promote peace and reconciliation being partial and compromised.

In order to realise peace through processes of recognition and reconciliation, different countries have adopted various mechanisms including truth and reconciliation
commissions and transformative justice processes (Sriram, 2011; Sooke, 2011). These efforts often involve the creation of spaces in which intercultural dialogue can occur about past divisions and violence – sometimes including an aspect of restorative justice. In addition to these mechanisms, post-conflict and divided societies have also struggled with the creation of such ‘civil spaces’ (Waghid, 2009) in which citizens (who may or may not have personal experience of recent conflict) can discuss commonalities and otherness, can interact and learn to live with otherness, and can air disagreements and contested histories without disrespecting each other. The importance of such dialogue within citizenship pedagogies is reflected in the many NGOs who speak of the importance of ‘dialogue’ in their programmes and activities. For one Lebanese NGO, established in 2002 and focusing on dialogue as a means of developing citizenship, this practice is essential to developing a sense of common and collective memory and understanding as a means to preventing further conflict,

‘part of the cultural heritage we were discussing was the whole memory of the conflict and the history of the conflict, which was a big issue, because the youth said that they don’t learn it in school… so for us and them, the idea was, the cycle of violence is continuing because we don’t know what happened’ (National NGO, Lebanon, 1/12/2014)

The inherent tensions in fostering dialogue about violence to pursue peace remain key concerns for peace-building initiatives. Such encounters, especially those involving young people and within school settings, are commonly seen as a vital ‘opportunity to bring conflicting parties together, to promote reconciliation and to educate a new generation of peaceful citizens who embrace particular norms’ (Jones, 2012: 131). While intended to ‘help new generations to understand the common ground they have’ (Bosnian NGO, 4/7/2013; see also Jones, 2012; Staeheli and Hammett, 2013) challenges remain as to whether attempting to realise peace through dialogue around problematic histories produces a vision of a common, peaceful future or simply produce renewed tensions and conflict. Weighed against these concerns are the potential implications of not talking about the past and how to then negotiate the memory of politics and the politics of memory (Staeheli and Hammett, 2010).

Proponents of such dialogues aimed at peace-building argue that without these discussions it is impossible to acknowledge and overcome the legacies of structural violence and build a peaceful citizenry (Staeheli and Hammett, 2013). As one Bosnian NGO (4/7/2013) representative outlined, ‘youth might be the future, but the past needs to be dealt with to get there, need to move beyond the political stalemate, this requires and is part of reconciliation which in turn requires truth telling’. A dominant concern for this organisation was that a public silencing of discussions of the past would make it impossible to achieve sustainable peace as private narratives of history would be perpetuated through inter-generational recollections within families and communities. Without a public discussion, the NGO argued, ‘we live in heavy denial… And living in such a state basically puts kids, it’s spreading fear and mistrust in their peers of different names or religions, or national identity’. Thus, while not talking about histories of division may prevent overt conflict, it produces a shallow and partial peace – a situation
of tolerance rather than reconciliation and substantive peace. Similar concerns were expressed by an NGO in Lebanon, who queried how an absence of discussion of recent conflicts within citizenship education curricula could allow for the development of a common nation or citizenship,

‘for example the civic education curriculum has no mention of the war… So how can you teach people history or citizenship or conflict management if you don't talk about the past in an unbiased way’ (28/10/2014).

Further complicating such decisions and practices are the constraints arising from practices and conditions that are rooted in the past – of everyday encounters where ‘the [divided and non-peaceful] past is inscribed in the political, economic and social geographies of the country’ (Staeheli and Hammett, 2013: 32). These encounters are not confined to built and symbolic landscapes or socio-spatial segregation, but recur through intergenerational transfers of memories and informal education. While it may be difficult to create civil spaces for peace-building discussions of historical injustice, spaces for everyday narratives of historical (and contemporary) division and oppression are legion, contributing to continued inter-group distrust, dislike and hostility (Waghid, 2009; van Ommernings, 2011). These collective memories often hinder the development of a united, civil identity and challenge efforts to promote reconciliation and justice, as outlined by an international NGO in Lebanon (11/9/2014),

‘They're [the post-war youth] only affected by their parents. The fact is that every house has been affected… you have a Lebanese that was killed by a Palestinian and vice-versa. We never mentioned it, but right now it's coming back – ‘Oh they killed my uncle, they killed my cousin’… So it's back, which means there's no reconciliation.’

The concern with reconciliation and memory is one repeated by many organisations involved in citizen formation and nation-building in divided societies, and one which further entwines issues of justice and peace. Thus, to promote a peaceful society and citizens, the promotion of justice is often located at the core of these practices and requiring discussion not only of ‘whether to’ but also ‘how to’ talk about the past and associated traumas and division as a means towards reconciliation and a peaceful future. Responding to these challenges, emphasis is placed upon two ideas. First, the need to build both dialogue and trust both between citizens and governments was essential to achieving both a peaceful society and realising justice, reconciliation and mutual accountability. Integral to these processes, is a requirement to embed ideas of trust, respect, tolerance and dialogue in daily life, to become practices of citizenship that promote peace and understanding.

Promoting trust building as a cornerstone for peace-building recognises how distrust contributes to division and conflict, and that trust can be both acquired and lost, and is a vital commodity both for fostering positive inter-community and government-community relations. In divided societies, it is often the marginalised and poorer who feel most distrust towards governments and elites as marginalised groups are those who
are most susceptible and vulnerable to violence and injustice. The danger in such situations is that a sense of exclusion, distrust and un-entitlement (Hammett, 2008) may build, pushing groups and individuals away from a common, civil, peaceful citizenship, as one Lebanese NGO (12/11/2014) explained,

‘in these poorer areas and in areas of conflict, because they don’t really feel like anyone cares, nor do they trust the government, not even the local government... This gap between the society and the public institutions might lead some people towards fundamentalism, because they regard the Lebanese government as incapable of providing them with their rights’.

Distrust between citizens and the state contributes to inter-communal tensions and conflict, meaning that peace-building in divided societies requires more than the simple replication of Western liberal democratic institutions. Rather, the realisation of meaningful – and contextually appropriate – democracy, represented through functioning, efficient and accountable institutions and practices of democracy are necessary to achieve peace and provide mechanisms for increasing citizen participation, defusing tension and conflict and underpinning future peace. This ideal was captured succinctly by one Lebanese NGO (8/1/2014), whose representative argued that ‘democracy and peace are really interrelated; and you need democratic decision making in order to reach a sustainable peace, and at the same time you also need peace to build a real democracy’.

However, the process of building ‘real democracy’ and substantive peace is never straightforward and often requires directly confronting the barriers meaningful democratic participation. Such thinking builds on ideas from transnational justice scholars, who argue that peace building strategies must include efforts towards social justice, reconciliation, emotional reparations and both economic and socio-political security at multiple scales (Pillay, 2011). In other words, a (perceived or actual) lack of not just equality but also of any opportunity to overcome (individually or collectively) marginalisation can undermine peacebuilding; as Murtagh and Keaveney (2006: 188) argue peace requires ‘new spaces of hope [for greater social justice be offered] to a beleaguered underclass’. Failures to address social injustice may undermine efforts to build peaceful citizens, as citizens (rightly or wrongly) perceive themselves unfairly subjected to various forms of state-backed violence or denied protection from non-state-backed forms of violence (see Hammett, 2008; Roberts, 2008; Zahar, 2012). In contexts marked by division and injustice, the promotion of peace and of ‘peaceful’ citizens therefore requires greater attention to the need for states to hold greater legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens due to historically developed distrust arising from the suppression of dissent and (sometimes violent) exploitation of citizens and civil society by ruling (political) elites (Roberts 2008).

The rebuilding of trust, as necessary to underpin stability and peace, can be achieved through the appropriate use of and control over legitimate use of force, the delivery of social/public goods provision, and ensuring the improvement of living standards for all (Roberts 2008), and – the second issue – the use of discourses of ‘peace’ in inclusionary
ways that continues to provide space for dissent and critical opposition. However, discourses of peace and peaceful citizenship can also be used in exclusionary and oppressive ways, stifling opposition or dissent and turning ‘peace-building’ in to ‘pacification’: peace as governmentality to produce self-disciplining citizen-subjects. In seeking to construct ideological consensus (or hegemony) such practices, either directly or indirectly conducted, contribute to the emergence of a post-political context within which political and philosophical disagreements are closed off and arenas of debate constrained, producing a form of liberal tolerance (Gill et al., 2012). Peace, therefore, can be deployed for progressive and regressive political purposes, either as a means towards greater social justice or as a tool of governmentality that protects the status quo and can result in a partial peace: peace for one group while entrenching violence and injustice for another (see Alatout, 2009; Baker, 2003).

Conclusions

The discussions above highlight the emergent tensions around how peace is defined, negotiated and practiced within a wider temporal processes and a specific political context. Although many practitioners are aware of the deployment of peace as a ‘mechanism for the transmission of Western-specific ideas and practices’ (Mac Ginty, 2008: 144), they also often pursue their own goals for systemic change under a broader conceptualization of peace. Although the practices and interventions of these organisations are intended to foster trust and the institutionalisation of nonviolent conflict management (Zahar, 2012: 74), the demands these organizations make for meaningful democratic participation and accountability may also challenge the very institutions of governance that donors see them as maintaining. Within these efforts, a key problematic remains the reliance upon liberal peace as a universal concept and one applied without sensitivity to context, temporality of conflict, historic social injustices, and the presence or absence of a common sense of nationhood or belonging (Boege et al., 2009; Mac Ginty, 2008).

Disentangling the complex interplay between and deployment of multiple (and contested) meanings of peace, democracy, and security are integral to understanding efforts to build peace through the terrain of citizenship. The intricacies of these negotiations highlight how the pedagogies of peaceful citizenship are continually challenged and adapted to fit local circumstances and demands. Key questions within these negotiations – ones we raise here but do not offer answers to – are what are the limits to peace? Whose version of peace is to be maintained? In the quest for ‘peace’ what kinds of peaceful citizens are imagined, desired and created? If it is only governments that are responsive to their citizens, efficient in service delivery, and equitable in protection of rights, that can maintain the necessary legitimacy and authority to secure peace, do pedagogies of peaceful citizenship potentially prevent the emergence of such a state by delegitimizing ways of holding the state accountable other than participation in the formal democratic process? In other words what kind of peace is being promoted, peace between citizens, or passive citizens who maintain their civil peace with the state?
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