WORKING PAPER 2

Producing Citizenship in Divided Societies

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21 August 2014
Producing Citizenship in Divided Societies:  
Pedagogy, Civil Society, and the Citizenship Industry

Abstract:
In this paper, we describe the efforts to promote citizenship amongst young people in divided societies. We analyse the work of what we call the ‘citizenship industry’ – a loosely connected network of organizations that attempt to instil norms, values and practices of liberal citizenship in countries around the world. The industry operates in a transnational field of civil society to promote a pedagogy of active citizenship. While the work of the citizenship industry is a central means by which habits of democracy and citizenship are spread, we point to the openness and ambiguity of young people’s actions as citizens. The argument is based on analysis of 400 NGOs and donor organizations and interviews with 92 organization representatives in Lebanon, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and South Africa.


**Introduction**

Citizenship, in its varied forms, cannot be assumed in societies that have been divided by conflict and violence, because in one way or another, the very meanings, boundaries, and experiences of citizenship may have been implicated in the conflict. Civil wars, for example, may have complex origins that are narrated in terms of the dominance of one group and the consequent marginalisation of another as citizens. Histories of intergroup relationships are often recast in such terms, making it difficult to identify the commonality or shared experiences that are said to be the basis of citizenship and nation. Indeed, the very meaning of citizenship in some languages is rooted in nation, thus imparting a particularity that is at odds with the putative universalism – in the sense of being available to all – of liberal citizenship. Despite the problematic nature and meaning of the term, most efforts to rebuild and stabilise governance after such conflicts involves imagining – and in some senses producing – a new meaning or definition of citizenship that can take a country forward. In these efforts, youth are often presented as a new generation who can act together to address societal problems and to build a future that moves beyond violence and division. National and international political institutions, foundations, and think tanks identify youth as key agents in making a new kind of politics that transcends conflict and difference.

Consider, for example, the NGO CitiAct, which operates in Beirut, Lebanon. Its full name is Citizen Activism, and according to its Facebook page, promotes citizenship, youth participation, human rights and conflict resolution under a cross-confessional umbrella (https://www.facebook.com/CitiAct). It receives a grant from PACE Lebanon; PACE stands for Promoting Active Citizenship and Engagement, and the programme is intended to support ‘non-partisan, non-sectarian NGOs that act as the voice of citizens, especially youth, women, minorities and persons with disabilities who are usually left out of public discourse.’ PACE’s grant programme provides ‘funds to civil society initiatives around issue-based civic advocacy, activism, and citizen active participation’ (http://www.msiworldwide.com). While funded by USAID, PACE is administered by Management Systems International, which is a subsidiary of Coffe International, Ltd. CitiAct uses its grant to train Lebanese youth in social media and street theatre, and often organizes flash mobs to illustrate the blockages created by sectarianism that threaten the stability of the country and the future of youth. Funding for CitiAct and PACE reflects the concern that international entities have for the political stability of the country, as well as for the capacity of civil society to nurture
citizens. Similar programmes are funded in Lebanon by UNESCO, the European Commission, the Open Society Foundation, the Anna Lindh Foundation, and the foreign ministries of western countries. These donor organizations also support similar programmes in other countries around the world, and are thus positioned in the interstices of global efforts to promote democracy, security and development in which a crucial step is the encouragement of citizenship that enacted in civil society.

The linkage between democracy, economic development and citizenship that is implied in such efforts is long-standing in academic discourse, the ‘gray’ literature, and international policies (e.g., Lipset, 1959; Putnam, 1993; Heller, 2013). Geographers have contributed to debates about these relationships through their attention to the spread of democratic institutions and practices (e.g., O’Loughlin, et al 1998), the relationships between the political economy and citizenship (e.g., Mitchell, 2003), and the ways that transnationalism and globalization seem to transform the relationship between citizens and the state (e.g., Hörschelmann and el Refaie, 2014; Lough and McBride, 2014). These debates highlight the roles of networks and the circulations of knowledge in the productions of democracy, citizenship, and the policies to support them (e.g., Häkli, 2013; Kuus, 2014). A central concern in much of this literature has to do with the ways that organizations within civil society are enrolled in fostering citizenship and whether such efforts encourage, dampen, or channel the agency of political subjects (Roberts, et al, 2005; Rasmussen, 2011; Boulding, 2014). The cluster of activities enacted by CitiAct and funded by PACE stands as an example of these issues. Their efforts draw on circulating knowledges and expectations of citizenship that are in some ways detached from the specificities of the countries in which they are implemented, but nevertheless need to negotiate both the ways that conflict is sedimented and the propensity of young people to behave in unintended ways. We argue that analysis of these relationships and activities can expose the mechanisms by which putatively democratic governance (in its many and contested forms) is spread, consolidated, challenged, and sometimes, collapses.

This paper provides a framework to understand the efforts to promote – or perhaps more accurately, to produce – citizenship amongst youth in divided societies. We argue that it is possible to conceptualize a citizenship industry that works in a transnational field of civil society to promote a pedagogy of citizenship that emphasises engagement and activity to address contemporary problems. We demonstrate, however, that the pedagogies of citizenship can also lead to practices and alternative productions that may challenge the kinds of citizenship the pedagogies may be intended to foster.
The argument we present draws on analysis of networks of over 400 civil society organizations that promote youth citizenship in Lebanon, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and South Africa, as well as interviews with a select set of organizations. While we draw on materials related to these three countries, we note that our analysis is consistent with the efforts to produce youth citizenship elsewhere, in both the Global North and South.

The Citizenship Industry

The lobby bar of the Raddison Blu Hotel in Beirut was a busy place in mid-January, 2011. The hotel itself was nearly empty, as most tourists were wary of political instability created by the resignation of the prime minister and the Parliament’s inability to agree on a new government. The lobby bar, however, was full of people greeting each other, trying to remember where they had last met, and realising that many of them were heading to Cairo where protests were just taking off. Eavesdropping on the conversations – most of which were in English – it seemed that many people either currently or had recently worked for international organizations of one type or another. UNESCO and USAID were mentioned, but it was evident that many people shifted employers, doing the same sort of democracy, security, or development work on short-term contracts for different programmes or as independent consultants (field notes, 23/01/2011). Scholars have previously identified both a ‘development industry’ and a ‘democracy industry’ (e.g., Wedel, 2001; Townsed, et al 2002), and it seemed that the people in the bar were part of what might be a ‘citizenship industry.’ They formed a professional cadre of consultants and advisors who went from country to country, offering advice to local officials and NGOs about politics, civic engagement, and good practice for training future leaders at the local level, who in turn, it was hoped, would assume the mantle of responsibility for building stable democracies, or at least governments that held some legitimacy.

Defining the Citizenship Industry

What we are calling the ‘citizenship industry’ is really a loosely connected set of governments agencies, international institutions, think tanks, foundations and charities, consultancies, non-governmental organizations, and activists that support efforts to instil norms, values, and practices of liberal citizenship. The agents within the sector may be located within a country rebuilding after conflict, or they may be from outwith the country. In recent years, this sector has grown dramatically, in part as a response to
economic crisis and the deteriorating situation of young people (which predates the most recent crisis) and also as a response to political instability. As noted previously, it is linked closely with development goals and with international efforts to consolidate democracy in ‘weak states’ and countries undergoing stresses of one form or another (IRDB 2006). In some ways, it provides the linkage between international practices of development and democracy promotion, particularly through a vision of an entrepreneurial and self-sufficient citizen. While many of these programmes are long-standing, such efforts were perhaps given even more emphasis after the Arab uprisings of 2011. One employee of a UN agency, for instance claimed that the uprisings demonstrated the ingenuity of youth and their ability to initiate change; it was, he suggested, a wake-up call for those who had largely seen young people as problems and as needing to be ‘fixed.’ While the outcomes of those uprisings and other protests around the world have not been unmitigated successes, the evident power and potential of young people drew renewed attention to them, and resulted in a commitment to mainstream youth issues within all UN activities (field notes, 08/05/2014).

The sector is rooted in long-standing efforts to build and sustain nations as they emerge from conflicts and violence and to diffuse particular styles of democracy around the world (Bell and Staeheli, 2001). A truncated, 20th century history of these efforts would include the League of Nations, the United Nations, the US-funded Marshall Plan, Bretton Woods, and even the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 1990s, which included standards for governmental transparency, accountability, and the fostering of civil society. The Peace Corps in the US also needs to be seen as part of this effort, as its volunteers were dubbed ‘democracy’s missionaries’ when the programme was established in the 1960s (Hoffman, 1998). The post-socialist transitions in the 1990s, however, provided the basis for the most recent emphasis on promoting citizenship, as there was a perceived ‘need’ to develop democratic practices, institutions and ethos in central and eastern Europe (Wedel, 2001). The efforts of governments, philanthropies, and think tanks that flocked to the region in many ways provided the foundation for the modern democracy and citizenship industries, which have been mobilised in post-conflict and transitional nations or at times when protests seem to threaten the stability of governments (Boulding, 2014).

In Lebanon, South Africa, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, there were over 400 organizations in 2014 that promoted citizenship and civic engagement to young people; these organizations received donations from over 1000 additional organizations.
Beyond these three countries, the sector is organized and to some extent structured through networks in which a handful of donors seem to play central roles. For instance, while we identified over 1000 donor organizations, a much smaller set of 12 donors fund multiple programmes. These include government agencies (e.g., USAID) and foundations (e.g., Open Society, Charles Stuart Mott, Heinrich Böll and Anna Lindh). The distinction between governments and foundations, however, is not always clear. The Anna Lindh Foundation receives most of its funding from the European Commission, and the German Green Party (one member of which was the Foreign Minister at the time of writing) funds the Heinrich Böll Foundation. They are joined by other apparently independent organizations such as the National Endowment for Democracy that are, in fact, fully funded by national governments (in NED’s case, the US Congress). Foreign governments and international organizations also fund programmes directly, sometimes as part of bilateral aid programmes, but also through their efforts at public diplomacy that highlight what one official termed “the good side of our foreign policy” (interview, 12/07/2011). What we are calling the citizenship industry, thus, comprises a complex mix of different kinds of organizations and funding relationships.

Part of the complexity reflects the increasing tendency of governments to use intermediaries to disburse funds and to work with smaller organizations in each country; this strategy is intended to ensure the professionalization of organization leaders, to monitor programming and to support financial management, as in the case of USAID’s PACE programme. These intermediary organizations are usually private consulting firms, often aligned with either the security or the development sector. They typically work with the grantees to ensure funds are used properly and efficaciously and that project goals are met. At least that is the intent. Some of grantees grumble that these intermediary organizations effectively top-slice the grants, such that most of the grant money remains in the donor country (e.g., interview, 27/01/2011). These intermediary organizations, however, also allow some NGOs to distance themselves from restrictions set by donors, which in turn allows the donor to extend its reach. This may be most significant for organizations, foundations, and agencies that are funded or controlled by national governments. For instance, some organizations in Lebanon claim to eschew USAID monies, because the funding contract disallows any contact or interaction with organizations that the US has named as supporting terrorism, including Hezbollah. We noticed that some of these NGOs, however, launched programmes sponsored by charities that do receive funding from the US government; apparently they interpret the
mediation of the charity as allowing them to work alongside Hezbollah-affiliated groups. Still other organizations argued that money was not the only way connections were forged, commenting on the roles of expertise, mailing lists, personal links, and even the availability of meeting rooms as shaping the structure of the local fields in which they worked.

The role of expertise is critical to the ideas and ‘best practices’ that are promoted by organizations, but also in building and sustaining a veneer of credibility and legitimacy (Dezalay and Garth, 2010). As Kuus (2014, p. 3) argues, expertise is an expression and performance of social relationships that one uses, more than it is an object or quality to possess. Academics are enrolled in shaping, performing, and imparting expertise in and through relationships that sustain the citizenship sector. Virtually all of the large donor organizations rely on academic research to support their work. For example, the National Endowment for Democracy was established in 1983 and funds programmes in transitional societies with the hope of solidifying and consolidating democracy around the world; it has been a major funder of citizenship programmes for youth in each of our case study countries. In 1990, NED established the *Journal of Democracy*, which is focused on the problems and prospects of emerging democracies. Larry Diamond was its founding editor, and later was the president of NED; he is also a fellow at the Hoover Institution and Stanford University. Other organizations provide fellowships and opportunities to bring activists and leaders of NGOs into sustained conversations with academics and other members of their own organizations. NED offers such fellowships, as do the Open Society Foundations, the World Bank, and UNESCO. They also commission reports from academics that are intended to cross a presumed divide between academic work and the world of practitioners, such as UNDP’s occasional papers (e.g., Heller, 2013). Any number of other examples could be adduced, as the boundary between government, policy, business, the academy, and civil society in the citizenship industry is porous.

Indicative of this porosity are the summer schools and training opportunities offered by universities in alliance with (often) large donor organizations. In a time when universities and academic institutions are being asked to demonstrate their ‘public value’, these courses provide an opportunity to highlight the role that universities can play beyond their walls. Almost everyone we interviewed had enrolled in one such specialized course, as foundations frequently sponsor summer schools in regions that have particular needs. The advantages of locating the summer schools in dispersed locations were
described by a field officer of a donor organization as offering several benefits: increased accessibility for NGO workers; the ability to tailor the curriculum to the ‘cultural specifics’ of a region; and building the capacity of universities and institutions within it. “We need,” this person commented, “to show that democracy and citizenship are not western imports, but are firmly based in their own cultures and traditions. Academics are treated with more respect in [that region]. If they do the teaching – as compared to an American or a western European – it will carry more weight. It will be seen as more legitimate” (interview, 08/05/2013). The programmes draw directly from theories and scholarship related to democracy and citizenship, and attempt to remind practitioners, in particular, of the broader goals and utility of democratic citizenship. Furthermore, short courses and conferences are often a requirement of grants from charitable organizations to universities. In this way, academics and research funders are brought into – and in some senses help to create – the expertise and milieu in which the citizenship industry operates.

Finally, as with most industrial sectors, there are ‘trade associations.’ One such organization is Civicus, which labels itself a ‘world alliance for citizen participation’ and proclaims ‘We exist to strengthen civil society and citizen action around the world’ (https://www.facebook.com/CIVICUS). It provides coordinating functions (such as regular meetings of civil society and citizen participation organizations), sponsors events, and provides analyses of the structure and robustness of civil society in countries around the world (e.g., Anheiner, 2004). Similar associations are often involved in coordinated action to develop national frameworks and policy instruments to promote citizenship and cosmopolitanism, which according to one NGO director, represented ‘a new form of solidarity’ (interview, 01/07/2013).

The citizenship industry thus promotes citizenship through expertise and the development of networks that link disparate types of organizations (governments, foundations, NGOs, private corporations and consultancy firms) in places around the world; through these networks flow professional relationships, money, expertise, and indeed, power. Some organizations are more central than others, because they wield greater authority and/or expertise, because they are connected with many other organizations, because they are able to animate the network in particular ways, or in other words, because they draw on diffuse sources of power.

Connecting the Citizenship Industry: the Field of Transnational Civil Society
To this point, we have used a number of terms that suggest a set of connected elements that structure the citizenship industry (e.g., networks, organizations, civil society, places) and are animated through a set of flows and circulations (knowledge, people, practices). In the abstract, these can be conceptualised as a field. Häkli (2013) argues that fields develop through social relationships that exert a ‘compelling force’ on actors and that are generated through deeply ingrained assumptions about what ‘ought’ to be, as well as active constructions of social, power-laden relationships. Taking the argument further, fields may shape logics and actions, but may be difficult to articulate, and their ‘origins’ may be murky. They are, instead, constituted through rules that are created and sustained through normative assumptions, histories, and context.

In the case of the citizenship industry, transnational civil society can be seen as a field of relationships that connects individuals in particular places with agents, ideas, and practices that circulate more broadly, rather than remaining circumscribed by nations or place. Indeed, the expectation that citizenship should be fostered and spread through civil society is almost unchallenged (cf, Jeffrey, 2012; Boulding, 2014). In circulating through the field, however, ideas and expectations are translated and modified and may be deployed by agents in various places and with divergent politics (Agnew, 2007). As such, the field should not be imagined as straightforward, apolitical or without contention. Instead, Häkli (2013, p. 352) suggests that we think of various transnational fields as a ‘tangle’ of ‘plural topological condition(s) rather than a singular large space.’ Following this argument, we can conceptualise civil society as interacting and entangled with other social fields, with norms that are understood as universal, and with the histories of specific places. In this field, knowledge and norms of citizenship are conveyed and solidified. While they may be shaped by putatively universal values and ideals, they are also inflected with histories associated with place and/or nation, and are infused with power relationships that position agents and ideas within the field.

The field is thus internally complex and is also situated with respect to other fields, agents, and influences. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) analyse this complexity by focusing on the extent and ways in which the field is autonomous or heteronomous. A field that is relatively autonomous is less affected by external, exogenous influences and is instead shaped by internal dynamic operating within the field. A heteronomous field is, by contrast, more easily influenced or disrupted by external forces. Building on these arguments, we can spatialize the field by thinking of sites within it that may be more or less autonomous without attempting to describe the field itself in terms of a single
continuum of autonomy or heteronomy. The field itself is internally differentiated, and relationships within it may condition the ways in which sites and agents operate.

Applying this to the citizenship industry, we can anticipate that agents operating in western capitals may be more closely attuned to political influences and constraints of western governments than are the field officers of the very same organizations who are further removed from the day-to-day influences of western states. Similarly, agents operating within the field of civil society but in smaller organizations ‘on the ground’ may be aware of rules governing the operations of their NGO that are necessary to maintain funding, but may nevertheless work around those rules with some impunity as they attempt to address immediate needs and issues that would otherwise be blocked by donor rules and state politics; Roy (2010) calls these ‘double agents’. We have also seen evidence that fields intersect and that activists slip between and across them. The use of intermediary organizations to work around restrictions on working with certain groups is one example of this. Another example is when NGOs used their funding to support activities that their ‘official’ donors might not support. Indeed, some representatives of donor agencies seemed uncomfortable when discussing instances where they knew their grantees were engaging in actions that were not aligned with the goals of the donor organizations (e.g., interviews 12/09/2011, 27/07/2013). One informant, instead, referred us to the book The Dictator’s Learning Curve (Dobson, 2012), which traces the sometimes unintended consequences of US efforts to ‘train’ activists (field notes, 13/08/2012). The implication is that the citizenship industry and the practices it produced are not fully heteronomous nor completely determined by the ideologies and vision of western donors and governments, but that there may be pockets of relative autonomy within the transnational field of civil society.

Yet it is evident that certain ideas and expectations of how organizations within the sector should act circulate and are adopted, even as they may be subverted or practiced in ways that might not be appreciated by donors. In these circulations – and their adaptations – we can see the ways that knowledge and power flow and are challenged. Perhaps the most pervasive set of expectations are those related to professionalization and transparency of local NGOs that do the work of the citizenship industry, as the field of civil society touches down in specific places.

Regulation, Transparency and Professionalization
Another hotel bar, another set of overheard conversations. This time, it was Washington, DC, home to a concentration of organizations – private, charitable and governmental – that fund and coordinate the citizenship industry. After first eavesdropping on two women and then striking up a conversation with them, the women discussed the importance of management expertise if NGOs were really going to build better, more democratic societies in countries that had been divided by conflict. Professionalization had a good side, in that they believed small organizations were becoming more transparent and more efficient in their use of funds. But there were some concerns, as well. One woman, who now works as a consultant to a well-known donor organization, talked about the ways that philanthropies and foundations were instituting more bureaucratic rules and procedures – ‘almost as if they are governments’ – that grantees needed to follow. Yet there was a contradiction inherent in what they wanted, she said. Donors wanted local NGOs to be able to respond quickly to events, but they also wanted full oversight and accountability. While understanding the need for keeping track of funds, she worried that accounting and auditing procedures would limit the ability of smaller NGOs to respond creatively: ‘We are in danger of training them to lose their innovativeness.’ Like many other people we interviewed, these women voiced both optimism and concern about the ways that NGOs at the grassroots were coming to be very similar in the ways they identify and frame ‘problems’ they will address, and that they all seem to apply the same toolkit in their actions. Money, not necessarily commitment, they noted, seemed to drive activity in the sector (field notes, 30/04/2014).

The women’s comments reflect the influence of regulation and attention to transparency and professionalization on conduct within the citizenship sector.

Regulation of the sector comes in several forms. Many of the organizations that are centrally located within the network that structures the sector are regulated through national laws and their own institutional frameworks. Tax laws, for instance, condition the ways in which philanthropic organizations operate (Crimm, 2003). Other legislation – such as security and anti-terrorism laws in the US – limit the kinds of organizations that can receive funds from organizations based in the country. There are also codes of practice – formal and informal – that serve to regulate the ways in which these organizations operate.

NGOs and social enterprises are also regulated, often through national requirements for registration (Bratton, 1989; Bolton and Jeffrey, 2008). In some countries, such as Lebanon, registering as a NGO is a relatively simple process, and is a
matter of filing a one page form. The ease of registering as a NGO has led to a proliferation of the organizations, many of which seem to have no external donors, no partners, and no activities. One person wryly observed that the limiting factor in establishing an organization was that there was often no government sitting and no one to receive the paper work (interview, 25/11/2013). In countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the international community has overseen the establishment of post-war governance structures, the process of establishing a NGO is more rigorous and organizations must show they conform to expectations related to financial probity, accounting, transparency and independence from political parties (Jeffrey, 2012). In South Africa, the country’s corporate social-responsibility laws require that companies contribute a portion of income to NGOs, social enterprises, or charitable activities. While these regulations are different in their specifics, reflecting as they do political histories and governance structures, the general point is that registration requirements set rules for NGO activities, including their ability to accept funds from various sources and the kinds of activities they in which they can engage. As importantly, international organizations rely on the registration process to ensure that the organizations to which they donate are ‘legitimate’ in the terms of the grantees’ countries (interview, 7/06/2014). But onto this legal standing set by specific countries, donors often impose their own regulations through their expectations of managerial behaviours and the professional conduct of business.

One of the most frequent comments made by donors is that potential grantees have good ideas, but that they are not always practical ideas; donors often have misgivings about the ability of NGOs to deliver what they promise. With respect to our three case study countries, concerns are raised about: corruption and inefficiency; ticking boxes for funding applications rather than meeting real needs; serving one group within a complex and diverse society; the difficulty of coordinating disparate efforts amongst groups; and ‘simple’ things like filling out forms properly and on time. All of the field officers and donor organizations described efforts to ensure that procedural aspects of running and developing a project did not scupper its prospects, and so established clear frameworks and procedures to help potential grantees prepare proposals, run their projects efficiently and transparently, and complete monitoring and reporting functions. As noted previously, many donors relied on intermediary organizations, and one of their functions was to work with smaller grantees to train them in appropriate management techniques, to provide guidance and support for reporting requirements and
transparency, and also to ensure compliance with rules for procurement and fair distribution of services (interview, 12/09/2011). Furthermore, these intermediaries offered a form of ‘translation,’ making the activities of local organizations fit within the technical language of philanthropy and grant-making in the Global North. Our respondents noted that these requirements took on particular importance with respect to programming for youth. They noted that young people might be vulnerable and many of the NGOs were run by young people themselves, who often lacked experience and practical knowledge of running a project, meaning that they required extra ‘care’ or ‘attention’, or what some might call managerialist oversight and control (e.g., Roberts, et al, 2005; Thörn, 2011).

While reporting and evaluation exercises took time and effort – and were sometimes resented by grantees – all donors required some form of financial and management reporting. Such reporting was seen as necessary to ensure effective use of funds, and also to justify expenditure to taxpayers ‘back home’ that might otherwise question overseas expenditures (interview, 12/07/2013) and as part of philanthropies’ own reporting requirements (field notes, 30/04/2013). But more than just a matter of book keeping, donors spoke of the need to professionalize NGOs and their directors if they were to see real change in the ways that young people understood citizenship and enacted it. In this way, the citizenship industry is little different than the development and democracy industries more generally (see Larner and Laurie, 2010; Baillie Smith and Laurie, 2011; Townsend, et al., 2002).

Much of the training in regional meetings sponsored by donors is provided by ‘local success stories’ (interview, 7/05/2013). Several of the NGO directors we interviewed had attended these meetings, and many had provided testimonials about their experiences or had actually led training sessions. One field officer from a donor organization thought that it was important to have people from social enterprises or who demonstrated entrepreneurial spirit give talks at these meetings, commenting that NGOs were major employers in the region and so it was necessary to provide examples of organizations that followed good practice and became self-sufficient. In addition, several of the NGO directors we spoke with recognized that external funding was becoming tight and so were developing consultancies that drew on their experiences managing projects; the revenue from these consulting activities then supported the NGO and their work with young people. One social entrepreneur even raised funds for her organization
from speaker's fees she was paid on the circuit of conferences and meetings organized by international donors (interview, 06/11/2013).

Almost all of our respondents had attended training sessions and management workshops intended to enhance organizational capacities, and it seemed that the training had paradoxical effects. Many of the NGOs fully conformed with respect to the specific procedures and programmatic expectations of their donors. Others, however, complied with procedures, but used the infrastructure provided by a grant to engage in other forms of participation in other issue arenas that did not conform to these expectations. These NGOs, it seemed, demonstrated their ‘enhanced capacity,’ by engaging in activism that conflicted with donor priorities. Field officers of donor organizations were often aware of this, but did little to curtail the activities, indicative, perhaps, of the ‘entangled’ field of transnational civil society in which the organizations operate and the political views of the field officers themselves.

The practices associated with professionalism are one example of what flows through the networks and field that comprise the citizenship industry. Through these practices, NGOs are expected to learn how to operate effectively as they train young people to become the kinds of citizens who can function in the context of societies that are deeply divided and whose national governments seem incapable of democratic governance. Just as ideas and practices are instilled in NGOs, however, the citizenship industry promotes particular norms and expectations for youth themselves through a pedagogy of citizenship that also circulates.

**Pedagogy of Citizenship in Civil Society**

‘Pedagogy’ is most commonly used in educational settings to describe the methods and practice of teaching. In the past twenty years, however, critical education scholars have expanded its usage to refer to the production and maintenance of dominant discourses that preserve a social order. One strand of this argument examines the so-called pedagogical state, in which cultural and social practices are instilled in citizens that both control behaviours and legitimate state action – and perhaps inaction (Bonal, 2003; Kaplan, 2007; Pykett, 2010). These arguments have addressed: the ways in which citizenship education programmes embed particular values; the ways that gendered and racialised norms shape social expectations; the relationship between public and private responsibilities; and more. Pedagogy, in this sense, is rarely written or explicated in formal policies, but instead provides the normative underpinning that justifies state
action to enforce particular behaviours. In the context of citizenship, we can look beyond the state, and identify a pedagogy that is shaped by the citizenship industry through the transnational field of civil society and that is enacted in diverse ways by NGOs and youth. It is a shared knowledge that circulates, contributes to a common understanding of citizenship, and guides action. In this way, the various agents within the citizenship sector are linked, learn from each, and develop a collective understanding (cf, Hajer, 1995). Scholars have argued that there are certain ‘universals’ of democracy and citizenship that are largely settled or agreed upon and that are part of this pedagogy. Of these universals, commitments to cosmopolitanism, to self-sufficiency and engagement, and to action in civil society are notable.

Cosmopolitanism
Within the pedagogy of citizenship, cosmopolitanism represents a means of overcoming conflict and building a future together. While there are many definitions and uses of cosmopolitanism, in almost all cases, it implies a sort of worldliness that stands in opposition to parochialism (e.g., Appaduri, 1996; Appiah, 2006). Used in a normative, ethical sense, cosmopolitanism invokes ideas of global citizenship, commitment to human rights, and universalism. And it seemingly stands in opposition to the bigotry, injustice, and nationalist or religious exclusion that may have triggered conflict (Held, 2010). As Calhoun (2008, p. 429) observes, the term permeates romantic descriptions of culture, politics, and ethics, and so is useful in the way that ‘seems to refer at once to a fact about the world – particularly in this era of globalisation – and to a desirable response to that fact’. That response, however, need not be otherworldly or global, but instead can be a response grounded in or drawing resources from place or from the recognition of sharing in place; it can, thus, be a ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ (Appiah, 2006). And rather than something that is a description of the present, it can be a goal, something to strive for, to ‘become’ (Jazeel, 2011). At a recent conference on citizenship, civil society and philanthropy, for instance, two participants – one employed by an academic think tank and another the director of a NGO focused on young people – engaged in a discussion over coffee of the ways in which some experiences shared by people who may have been on different ‘sides’ of a conflict could be reframed to show that all parties were affected by division or by violence. They agreed, as well, that ‘place’ could provide the commonality – the shared interests – in working together, in building a
new identity, and offering a vision of a place that was inclusive, rather than exclusionary (field notes, 05/05/2014).

The importance of cosmopolitanism in its various manifestations is evident in the pedagogy of citizenship deployed in post-conflict settings. It can be seen in the programming of international organizations and NGOs that offer training to government officials and to NGOs; it runs through formal curricula and national education policies; it is even promoted as a constituent element of new national identities (Staeheli and Hammett, 2013; Stevick and Levinson, 2007). Importantly, however, the ways cosmopolitanism is described vary, as do its relationships with globalism.

The most common expression of cosmopolitanism across our three case study countries emphasised the importance of encounters with difference. Virtually all organizations highlighted their offerings that engage young people from diverse backgrounds in events where they could discuss issues, participate in inter-cultural exchanges, and learn about each other. Young people would also gain research and problem-solving skills and be trained as leaders who would then spread the same messages about dialogue, inclusive identities, and ways of living in a shared place. Metaphors of boats, roads and bridges are common in the ways organizations describe the ideas they attempt to instil. One NGO in Lebanon, for instance, organized its programming around the idea that ‘we are all in the same boat’ and included a cruise down the coast of the country to give participants a feel for what it meant to share a small space (interview, 27/01/2011). A South African social enterprise gave young people in a remote town funds to build a road that would connect this town with the rest of South Africa; in the process, young people would learn skills, gain confidence, and do something tangible to build a kind of unity that the South African government called upon, but did little to promote (interview, 30/10/2013). Time and again, organizers commented on the need to bring people together, to provide safe spaces of encounter in which young people could learn from each other, and with almost evangelical commitments, disseminate the messages of inclusion, solidarity, and a grounded form of cosmopolitanism.

A second expression of cosmopolitanism is pragmatic in embracing the necessity for youth – and others – to learn to live and work together. Several people argued it was not difficult to persuade youth of this, as it was youth’s inclination in any event. This was often expressed as a future orientation that was uninterested in the past. One Bosnian activist said he was bored with talk about the war; instead, it seemed more
important and productive to deal with issues as they exist now (interview, 04/072013). The protests that wracked the country in February 2014 were testimony to that sentiment, as were the plenums – participatory forums for direct democracy – that were established in their wake. In these efforts, organizers and activists seek to find new forms of solidarity that are not exclusionary, that are not oppressive, and that can be the basis for a different kind of politics. The central concern of this aspect of the pedagogy of citizenship is to bring formerly excluded groups into the polity, so that they are seen as – and so that they feel – part of a newly (re)formed country characterised by diversity, tolerance, and peace.

*Self-sufficiency, entrepreneurship and engagement*

A second universal in the pedagogy of citizenship is the way that citizens are imagined as self-sufficient, self-governing, and engaged in their communities and society. Self-sufficiency and the ability to govern oneself are associated with many forms of citizenship, including both liberal and neoliberal forms. The autonomous liberal citizen looks suspiciously like the self-sufficient and self-governing citizen described by Foucault and associated with neoliberal governmentality (Rasmussen, 2011), and as such, the pedagogy emphasizes the importance of knowledgeable, capable citizens who create the change that the country needs for the future. Training programmes and their attention to leadership and research skills are a part of this, but so are the programmes to promote entrepreneurialism; almost all of the citizenship programmes we encountered offer training in entrepreneurship. In part, this is in recognition of the dire economic conditions in which many young people live. Immiseration, it is feared, breeds radicalism or can reactivate xenophobia and nationalism (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Schwartz, 2010). Indeed, youth unemployment is seen as one of the greatest threats to democratic futures by many international organizations and western governments. As Uzra Zeya, the acting US Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor has argued, unemployment ‘can lead to disenfranchisement,’ creating a downward cycle whereby youth become ‘more vulnerable to labor exploitation because they are desperate to find work and don’t have a voice in society.’ As a result, ‘this generation is on the front lines – at once the most visible and the most vulnerable,’ and so requires special attention to ensure their participation in civil society and the labor force (Morse, 2013). In these comments, self-sufficiency (i.e., skills development and employment) is critical to the ability and willingness of young people to make changes through
engagement in civil society. In turn, these emergent citizens should make fewer claims on the state, which in any event, may be unable to respond to the problems of divided, post-conflict societies. While this may be pragmatic in the context of weak and/or ineffectual states, it is also an ideological response that reflects a consensus about how countries and citizens should function.

Relatedly, there is a chain-like assumption within the pedagogy of citizenship that entrepreneurialism will lead to prosperity, and that prosperity will ensure the durability of cosmopolitan values and practices. This, in turn, reflects assumptions within the literature on the consolidation of democracy that economic prosperity is a ‘requisite’ of democracy (e.g., Lipset, 1959; Gill, 2000) and that economic crisis heightens feelings of vulnerability and xenophobia. Many organizations we interviewed whole-heartedly embraced the linkage between economic development and citizenship in their programming, with most linking entrepreneurship with ideas about responsibility of citizens to self, to family, to community, and to the nation. Yet as Mitchell (2003) has argued, citizenship takes on a strategic dimension when linked to prosperity and economic advancement. For example, Collier and Heoffler (2004), note that people who have begun businesses and families may be engaged in their communities, but they are unlikely to engage in protests that might destabilize a state. Furthermore, making individual citizens responsible for their own well-being and for that of their communities and society may effectively absolve the state of its responsibilities (Ilcan and Lacey, 2011).

But if that belief in the importance of self-sufficiency and entrepreneurialism is endemic in the sector, it would be a mistake to assume that the politics of self-sufficiency are also shared, particularly if engagement and entrepreneurship are assumed to support (or prop up) a state. One South African organization, for example, combines research and entrepreneurial skills in visual arts training for youth and uses the ‘products’ made by participants to fund the organization. Initially offering training in photography and video, the organization has revamped its citizenship training along a social enterprise model. It now teaches research, marketing, and media production skills to young people, who then put those skills to work in developing ad campaigns for other non-profits and NGOs in support of social justice causes. The clients pay for the services and youth also receive some payment. The intention is that participants will then take the skills they have learned to develop their own businesses, and also political action campaigns to address marginalization and injustice in their communities; in a sense, the organization
hopes to train young people to make a business of political action. This has, the director
confesses, taken longer to get off the ground than anticipated because ‘people are just
waiting. There is a culture of waiting here. That is why our theory of change emphasizes
action. They need to be active and stop waiting. Young people – all people – have the
power. That’s why we talk about active citizenship’ (interview, 08/11/2013). The
citizens this organization hopes to encourage are self-sufficient, knowledgeable,
entrepreneurial, and committed to progressive – and even radical – change.

Civil Society and Active Citizenship

The third universal of the pedagogy of citizenship we observed involved an emphasis on
citizen engagement in civil society, but not necessarily in the state. In this way civil
society functions as a grounded site of citizenship formation, not simply a transnational
field, in that civil society is promoted as a site in which citizenship can be performed.

All of the donors and organizations we interviewed promoted some form of
active citizenship, and they struggled to understand why we thought this was interesting.
Many respondents also gave us blank looks when we asked them why civil society was so
important. Yet other respondents became animated and enthusiastic when we raised the
issue of activism in civil society: ‘That’s right! Civil society!’ exclaimed one woman, who
had otherwise seemed rather uninterested in the interview (16/04/2014). Rather than
answering the question we asked, most respondents talked about the need to build up
civil society, to make it truly civil and embracing, rather than divided and organized
through patronage. No respondent, however, questioned the importance of active
citizenship in civil society.

Donor organizations were more comfortable explaining the importance of
building citizenship in civil society. Several answers were laced with theoretical
arguments about democracy and encounter in an inclusive public sphere. Others worked
with a theory of change that formed the basis of their strategic vision. Others noted that
volunteering in civil society was a way to build up skills that could enhance employment
opportunities. Most important, however, were pragmatic considerations:

There is deep distrust of government institutions [here]. To the extent that
institutions function, they often serve only one side. We need to build the capacity
of civil society if anything is going to change. We need to build bridges with all
communities in the country. But at the same time, there is distrust between the
government and the NGO world. (Interview, 15/04/2014)
The implication of the latter comment was that those bridges would need to be built through the active engagement of citizens who would both model and bring about change.

While the need for a citizenry engaged in civil society and communities was unquestioned, there was no agreement as to whether this should lead to more overt and explicit political action. Most of our respondents spoke of politics in terms of the government, elected officials and political parties, and most were wary – if not hostile – to politics in this sense. In both Lebanon and Bosnia, ‘political’ was defined in terms of parties, most of which were seen as sectarian or nationalist, and involving patronage and corruption (e.g., interview, 26/11/2014). For these respondents, civil society seemed to stand in opposition to politics, which had divided the country. As a result, many of the NGOs did not include young people affiliated with political parties in their programming. Other NGOs, however, took slightly different stances. Some argued that excluding politically-affiliated youth was counter-productive, and that the goal should be to train those youth to look beyond politics, or at least to listen to other people (interview, 01/07/2014). Still others took a view of politics that associated it with change, rather than with parties or governments. This view was, perhaps, most frequently expressed in South Africa, where the ANC had embodied political struggles for justice and equality. In all three countries, however, we encountered activists and organizations that believed that civil society was a relatively autonomous space where youth could learn organizational skills, could press their claims against corporations and against the state, and could even begin to organize for direct democracy and provision (e.g., field notes, 31/10/2013). For these respondents, organizing in civil society was essential, as civil society is ‘where the voices of the people can be heard’ (interview, 01/11/2013). From the perspective of the latter organizations, rights are important as moral claims, but are only useful as tools when paired with insurgent engagements and acts that break with the established order; rights were not sufficient for democratic citizenship in general and are only of limited utility.

More broadly civil society is mobilized in the pedagogy of citizenship as a site of associational life – for some, akin to a public sphere – in which ideas can be debated and efforts to hold the state to account can be organized. It can be a site of encounter based on moral equality and respect in which the civitas can act to support the state, but might also act as a check on state power (Boyd, 2006). While it is imagined as a space of civility, it is also a space of politics. The pedagogy of citizenship calls upon – and in
some senses, anticipates the production of moral equality that leads to particular ways of being, as compared to a standing that both compels and enables change and transformation (see Holston, 2008; Isin, 2008). This difference may seem subtle, and the two ways of thinking about citizenship are not necessarily incompatible. Instead, what they suggest is that there is a struggle for the framing, meaning and experience of citizenship that circulate in the efforts to produce citizens.

**Ambiguous Productions of Citizenship**

If there is, as the subtitle of Dobson’s (2012) book implies, a ‘global battle for democracy,’ it is hard to know who or what is ‘winning’. Despite what may be their hopes for the future, the efforts of organizations and activists circulating a pedagogy of citizenship through the transnational field of civil society will not unproblematically yield citizens that quietly assume the mantle of active citizenship, engaging in society, but not making demands on the state; we have provided examples of the ambiguous productions of citizenship throughout the paper. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, where young people played important roles in toppling dictatorships only to see them replaced by differently repressive regimes and instability, the expression of citizenship by youth cannot be assumed to have stable, determinant outcomes.

There is, thus, an openness to the productions of citizenship through the sector that reflects the other networks and fields in which youth are embedded. Organizations and agents within the citizenship industry provide skills and some resources for young people, but often seem uncertain about the politics that are involved in citizenship. What might be seen as desirable by international donors might be seen as threatening to national governments that are called upon to implement curricula and support policies related to youth. For example, the cosmopolitan commitments promoted within the pedagogy of citizenship can be in conflict with nationalist tendencies and politics. In other cases, as young people engage the forces, actors, and relationships that are part of the transnational field of civil society, some of them will undoubtedly disrupt the field, and the societies the field touches; at least some will challenge the state, the society, and even the international organizations that might have supported their training.

Organizations and agents within the citizenship industry provide the skills and (some) resources for young people, but often seem to shy away from grappling with the issues that young people care about, instead rhetorically assigning youth with the responsibility to be agents of change and transformation. It is not necessarily that
dealing directly with conflict is ‘written’ into the pedagogy; instead, silence on how to deal with conflict provides a sort of demonstration effect (Roy, 2010), suggesting that not dealing with an issue is the best strategy. Those conflicts and divisions remain between young people, as well as in the society at large. As such, the process of shaping and energizing citizenship is likely to embed division, potentially making the production of citizenship a contentious process. When activated, young people will enter the tangle of forces, actors and relationships that are part of the transnational field of civil society, and at least some of these entrances will undoubtedly disrupt the field and the societies the field traverses. What some enthusiasts of the ‘diffusion of democracy’ (e.g., Huntington, 1991) overlook is the way that democracy and citizenship open the possibilities for a variety of political expressions that are not inevitably ‘consolidated’ in a straightforward manner. The pedagogy of citizenship may circulate through the transnational field of civil society as a means of instilling norms, expectations and practices, but the outcomes are not predetermined.

There should, therefore, be no expectation that the politics young people bring to citizenship and to the issues facing their communities will settle or solve issues; they are as likely to upset a situation as they are to calm them. Almost every representative of international, national and local organizations agreed with this assessment, albeit with varied levels of comfort with it. Indeed, a successful ‘implementation’ of the pedagogy of citizenship carries with it the possibility, or even likelihood, that citizens will undo or reshape the pedagogy and the field precisely through their engagements and entanglements. Even as the citizenship industry promotes a consistent pedagogy, the production of citizens and citizenship will have ambiguous and indeterminate outcomes and politics.
Literature Cited


Huntington, Samuel (1991) *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*.


Notes

1 The networks of civil society organizations were constructed from internet searches, news accounts, and directories of NGOs in the three countries. We include organizations if their mission statements or self-descriptions include references to youth, citizenship, empowerment, or civic participation. From organizations’ websites and annual reports, we identified donors and partners that supported NGO activities related to youth and citizenship. We then conducted 92 semi-structured interviews with organizations and had numerous informal conversations with people at rallies and other events that we observed. Some of the people interviewed themselves young, as NGOs and social enterprises are major employers of young people in the three countries. The participants were promised confidentiality for themselves and for the agency/organization with which they worked. We therefore do not attribute quotes or individuals or name organizations that we observed. Names are, however, used when information comes from publicly accessible sources. We take care when we do name organizations in a paragraph to not include observations or quotes from the organization in the same paragraph.